Finding a Home for Eudaimonia
With respect to its status as a good, where does Aristotle’s eudaimonia belong? I have a question.
What about the primacy of eudaimonia? I suppose there are at least a few options. (A) It could be a good whose status as a good is independent of the desires or concerns of the virtuous. So one might say “virtue X is a good because it stands in just the right relation (whatever that is) to the promotion/expression of the supreme good, eudaimonia.” Or, (B): eudaimonia could be a good because it is what virtuous agents aim for, such that it’s status as a good is derivative of the good of virtue itself. So I suppose in (A) eudaimonia’s role as a good is prior to the good of virtue, whereas in (B) it is virtue that stands in that role of primary good.